Discussion:  Darwin's argument in the origin by Hodge, M.J.S.
promoting access to White Rose research papers 
   
White Rose Research Online 
 
 
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/3230/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Published paper 
Hodge, M.J.S. (1992) Darwin's argument in the origin, Philosophy of Science, 
Volume 59 (3), 461 - 464. 
  
 
 
 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
DISCUSSION: 
DARWIN'S ARGUMENT IN THE ORIGIN* 
M. J. S. HODGEt 
Division of History and Philosophy of Science 

Department of Philosophy 
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Various claims have been made, recently, that Darwin's argumentation in the 
Origin instantiates and so supports some general philosophical proposal about 
scientific theorizing, for example, the "semantic view". But these claims are 
grounded in various incorrect analyses of that argumentation. A summary is 
given here of an analysis defended at greater length in several papers by the 
present author. The historical and philosophical advantages of this analysis are 
explained briefly. Darwin's argument comprises three distinct evidential cases 
on behalf of natural selection, cases, that is, for its existence, its adequacy and 
its responsibility. Theorizing, today, about evolution by natural selection in- 
volves a similar structure of evidential and explanatory concerns. 
There are now in the literature several sustained attempts to show that 
Darwin's argumentation in the Origin of Species ([I8591 1964) fits and 
so vindicates some general philosophical proposal concerning scientific 
theorizing. There is, however, no consensus about that argumentation nor 
about the philosophical proposals. Most notably, Ruse (1975) has written 
on Darwin and the "received view" of the logical empiricists, Thagard 
(1978) on Darwin and inference to the best explanation, Lloyd (1983) on 
Darwin and the "semantic view", and Kitcher (1985) on Darwin and ex- 
planatory unification. 
Recker (1987) has examined these writings and concluded that they all 
fail in fitting Darwin exactly to their favored general proposal. Hodge 
(1989) reached the same conclusion. Even more recently, Sintonen (1990), 
disagreeing with Recker, has claimed that a certain version of the se-
mantic view does fit and is vindicated by the Origin, while Wilson (1992) 
has presented Darwin's theory as having the logical structure and obser- 
vational evidence of a paradigm in Kuhn's sense. 
The purpose of the present discussion is to explain why Sintonen's 
claim cannot be accepted, and, much more broadly, to indicate some 
conditions that any such claim must meet if it is to be historically accurate 
and philosophically cogent. 
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Ultimately, the reason why Sintonen's claim must be declined is that 
it is grounded in a mistaken analysis of Darwin's argumentation in the 
Origin. Recker had urged-also mistakenly as it turns out (Hodge 1989)- 
that throughout the Origin Darwin is always arguing for the causal efficacy 
of natural selection, but that Darwin deploys three distinct argumentational 
strategies on behalf of this single causal efficacy thesis. Sintonen (see, 
especially, 1990, 689), disagreeing, holds, instead, that Darwin has two 
arguments: a short one to establish the existence of natural selection, and 
a much longer one to establish its explanatory sufficiency for a wide range 
of phenomena. 
Although Sintonen gets closer to a correct analysis of Darwin's argu- 
mentation than Recker, his two-argument analysis is still incorrect. His 
mistake has arisen, as did Recker's, mostly from not seeing how Darwin 
conformed the structure of his argumentation to the Vera causa (true cause) 
ideal. Both Recker and Sintonen give extensive discussions of this ideal 
as it was discussed by such authors as Herschel, Whewell and Mill in 
the 1830s and 1840s, but neither has seen (nor has Wilson) that in con- 
forming his argumentation to that ideal, Darwin knowingly constructed 
three distinct, evidential cases, three component arguments, on behalf of 
natural selection: first, a case for its existence as a causal process going 
on in the world; second, a case for its adequacy, its competence to pro- 
duce, adapt and diversify species; and, third, a case for its responsibility, 
for, that is, its having produced the species now living and the extinct 
species found as fossils. So, in sum, natural selection exists, it can have 
that sort and size of effect, and it has indeed formed the species that have 
originated so far. 
The drift of these three arguments-or, better, evidential cases within 
Darwin's "one long argumentw-can be recalled briefly. The first and 
second arguments are contained in the first eight chapters of the Origin, 
in its first edition. As for existence, species in the wild are subject to 
changes in conditions of life, and domesticated species show that any 
animals and plants exposed to changed conditions vary heritably. There 
is hereditary variation in the wild, then. There is also a struggle for life, 
for there is superfecundity and this entails a struggle for food, space and 
other limited requirements for life. In this struggle for life, there is a 
differential survival and reproduction of hereditary variants, for some he- 
reditary differences affect chances of survival and reproduction. There 
exists in nature, therefore, a process of selective breeding, a process anal- 
ogous to the selective breeding practiced by farmers and gardeners. As 
for adequacy, artificial selective breeding is known to be sufficient, com- 
petent, or adequate to produce, within a species, distinct races-of dogs, 
for example-adapted to distinct human ends. These races do not count, 
according to customary criteria, as distinct species. But natural selection 
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has vastly longer to work and is much more comprehensive and discrim- 
inating. So, it can then produce races that would count as species, for 
they would be more permanently and more perfectly adapted and diver- 
gent in their organization, and hence infertile with one another, true breeding 
in their characteristics and without intermediate varieties. (There is more 
to Darwin's adequacy case, obviously, but this is the primary line of 
reasoning.) 
The third argument is contained in the next five chapters (the ninth, 
that is, through the thirteenth). As for responsibility, the theory that nat- 
ural selection has been the main agency responsible for bringing into being 
the living and extinct species is more probable, and so is to be preferred 
over any rival theory because it is better than any other at explaining 
several kinds or classes of facts about those species: biogeographical facts, 
embryological facts and so on. 
Since I have set out elsewhere (Hodge 1977, 1987, 1989, 1991a and 
1991b) the textual grounds and other advantages of this three-case, or 
three-component argument, explication of the one long argument of the 
Origin, and since I have indicated there, too, what can be learned from 
the growing, specialist literature on such topics in the history of the phi- 
losophy of science as the Vera causa ideal, let me allude here only to 
some leading reasons for seeing this explication as historically instructive 
and philosophically suggestive. 
As the papers just cited attempt to show, Darwin's argumentation is in 
keeping with Herschel's and Lyell's endorsement of this ideal as an ap- 
propriate ideal for geological science; his argumentation is, therefore, not 
in keeping with Whewell's rejection of the appropriateness of this ideal 
for that or any other science, nor, therefore, with Whewell's proposed 
replacement for this ideal in natural science, generally-namely, the con- 
silience of inductions. More remotely, then, Darwin's commitment to this 
ideal is in descent from Reid's elaboration of what he took to be the 
implications of Newton's dicta about true and sufficient causes. 
So much here for history. Philosophically, it is surely worth asking 
whether current theorizing about evolution by natural selection still takes 
the same form that Darwin gave his theorizing in 1859. For, as one of 
those papers (Hodge 1987) just cited urges, despite mathematical, 
Mendelian and molecular developments in this century, much the same 
structure of enquiry persists. There are questions about the definition of 
natural selection, and, beyond those definitional questions, there are em- 
pirical questions about its occurrence and prevalence (i.e., existence), 
about its consequences and capacities (i.e., what it suffices to effect), 
and about its past achievements (i.e., for what it has been responsible). 
These three clusters of empirical questions descend directly from the old 
Vera causa evidential and explanatory concerns. 
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It would seem, therefore, that if the analysis of Darwin's argumentation 
hinted at here is correct, then it imposes constraints on two genres of 
task. First, anyone seeking to throw light on Darwin's argumentation- 
whether by means of semanticist, Kuhnian, or any other type of general 
philosophical proposal-must show how light is thrown on the three- 
case, or three-component-argument, structuring of that argumentation (see 
Hull 1989, 319). Second, anyone seeking to capture the form taken by 
current theorizing about evolution should be able to show how a similar 
structuring of evidential and explanatory concerns continues to be in- 
volved in establishing the empirical status of the theory of evolution by 
natural selection when this is construed, as it surely has to be, as a prob- 
abilistic causal theory. 
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